General Clark has provided valuable insight into conducting modern war. His book deals almost exclusively with the political ramifications of the Kosovo War. He educates the reader into the efforts regquired to communicate with his US military superiors - the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the SecDef, NSC leadership, the president, and others. But that is only half the effort. The second requires communicating continually with NATO leadership plus the military and political leadership of NATO member countries. It is an incredible story.

I read the book to get a better understanding of what happened in the Kosovo War. It provides one insider perspective. Will read other books to get other views.

In this book we see that General Clark is the real force behind the conflict in Kosovo. Clinton rarely appears. I'm not sure Vice President Gore is even mentioned. Cohen and General Shelton are enigmatic. However, Holbrook is terrific. So is Secretary General Javier Solana. I was surprised how much conflict there was between Cohen, Shelton and Clark. It seems to me that the Kosovo conflict would have been much easier if Clinton or Gore had actually bothered to speak to General Clark. Instead, he is left to deal with Cohen and Shelton, who leave him without the resources he needs or even bother to include him in on important meetings.
I watched this conflict carefully as it unfolded. All right-wing republicans were rooting for America to lose. The Serbs were savvy enemies. Clinton was in the middle of Monica Lewinsky scandal. I don't think Clark will ever receive the credit he deserves. But some of us out here noticed what he did.
General Clark's most important messages concern the future of warfare. He has many important things to say. This timely and important book is required reading for anyone in the military, and anyone voting on military matters.
For me it was another great American general writing his story. It is also very well-written and appears to really capture General Clark's voice.

General (retired) Clark writes an excellent piece on both the events leading up to our entry into Kosovo and the continued decline of the American warrior spirit.
I served seven months in Kosovo with KFOR 1B on Camp Monteith. General Clark's book answers many of the questions we all had while patrolling the trash strewn streets of Kosovo, "Why the hell are we here?". General Clark gives a great lead up to the Serbian aggression in Kosovo and the Albanian provocations which we once again see in Macedonia. His thoughts are well written and easy to read. Starting with the Dayton peace accords, which he was a key player in, Clark takes us through the twisted negotiations and difficulties of the Balkans. His story shows the inherent difficulties in coalition warfare and how I (and thousands of other soldiers) eventually arrived to put "boots on the ground." The other interesting aspect of this book is to watch how the military was severely restricted, almost to the point of endangering American lives, to protect a weak and unclear political agenda. Not only did General Clark have to fight Serbs, NATO, the air power pundits and the media, he also had to fight against his leadership in SecDef Cohen. A great read and interesting story about NATOs first war. Lets hope we never have to go through an experience like the Kosovo Campaign again. Buy this book. You'll throughly enjoy it! -CPT S

General (ret) Wesley Clark's recollections of events leading up to the 1999 bombing campaign against Serbia truly has something to upset or annoy everyone.

Before we go into the details of all the various fashions in which GEN Clark can make everyone unhappy, let us consider the context of the publication of this book. The book was published in 2001, shortly after he was fired for his performance as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), both the military commander of NATO and the senior U.S. military officer in Europe. At that point, it seems likely that he was already considering his attempt to run for the Presidency. And limiting what he could say would be (hopefully) a desire to continue to protect classified information that he was in possession of as a general in the U.S. military. So we see indications that this work could be a self-aggrandizing apologia with a gag-order.

The first thing that can upset folks. GEN Clark personally pressured, directly and indirectly, the U.S. to rush into a European war in the Balkans. A constant theme through the text is that both military and civil leaders (including President Clinton) were very reluctant to get the U.S. more deeply involved in the troubles in the Balkans, and very, very reluctant to enter another war. GEN Clark repeatedly appealed to them to use military power to force Serbia under Milosovic to change his internal policies. He also went to directly to the media with his message and through public opinion forced elected leaders and their appointed representatives to comply to his (GEN Clark's) intent. The other interpretation of this is that GEN Clark was the only American leader that *really* cared about the Kosovars and their plight at the hands of the Serbs.

The second thing that should upset people. GEN Clark never mentions any attempt to find out why the Serbs were conducting operations in Kosovo. If, at the very first allegation of violence in Kosovo, GEN Clark and the NATO leadership had made a concerted effort to find out why the Serbs were doing what they were doing, they would have found out that the Kosovo Liberation Army were terrorists and heroin smugglers. This suggests many approaches to resolving the conflict without resorting to a bombing campaign. The Serbs were demonized from the first moment that events bagan to unfold in Kosovo, and never offered a solution other than "stop that or we shoot".

The third thing to upset everyone: GEN Clark put European interests ahead of U.S. interests. GEN Clark relates that Javier Solana, Sec. Gen. of NATO, expressed that failure to act in Kosovo would jepordize the existence of NATO, and that this could not be allowed. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO has been floundering in search of relevance, and has evolved into more of an economic club than a true military defensive alliance. Ultimately, NATO is of much greater benefit to it's European members than the U.S. By supporting Solana's objectives, GEN Clark put NATO and European interests ahead of U.S. national security. The counter argument is that Europe's security is America's security, but with the competing interests and lack of agreement inside Europe, this argument is a sweeping generality, a great sound bite, but devoid of substance.

The fourth thing that should upset absolutely anyone: The bombing campaign was in its second month before NATO sat down and tryed to hash out what the objective, the goal, the desired outcome was. If an Army colonel were to begin a lower level operation (say with 2000-3000 soldiers) without a clear endstate, a concise discription of his/her desired outcome, that colonel would be relieved on the spot. If a four-star general begins an operation without a clear objective, a stated goal, well... GEN Clark seemed to take it for granted that this was OK.

On the other side of the ledger, the book is engaging and well written. The events are laid out chronologically and with enough detail to make it flow well. Despite the constant name dropping, the material was engaging and comprehensive. It also is an education into the inner workings of NATO, and the relationship between SACEUR, the Pentagon, and the President. It doesn't quite give a day by day description of the attack on Serbia, but would be an excellent resource for filling in the blanks behind a dry, academic history of the conflict. This will be an essential work for future historians of the post-Yugoslavia Balkans.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: (to U.S. Government) Gentlemen, there is a lot to do and very little time to do it, in order to prevent. .

GOV'T: Wait. Prevent? We don't Prevent things, General.

CLARK: Why the hell not?!

GOV'T: Because it would be too similar to admitting we were wrong during the Cold War.

CLARK: We were wrong a lot of the time during the Cold War.

GOV'T: You are so fired after you retire early in disgust of this administration. .