Arabia, the Yemen Civil War drew in other regional players such as Iran and Israel . The Egyptian-inspired revolution that overthrew the Imamate in Yemen in September 1962 presented British policy makers with a series of acute dilemmas.

Arabia, the Yemen Civil War drew in other regional players such as Iran and Israel, both of whom supported the Royalists as a way of weakening Nasser. While the defence of Aden was regarded by the Chiefs of Staff as central to the protection of British interests in the Middle East, the means by which this was to be achieved exposed deep cleavages among policy-makers chastened by the experience.

Between 1962 and 1965 Britain engaged in covert. The book examines the extent to which British policy, while successful in imposing a war of attrition upon Nasser in the Yemen, contributed to the political demise of the very objective covert action was designed to secure: the future stability of the Federation of South Arabia.

Between 1962 and 1965, Britain engaged in covert operations in support . This book - now in paperback - examines the extent to which British policy, while.

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Examines the extent to which British policy, while successful in imposing a war of attrition upon Nasser in the Yemen, contributed to the political demise of the very objective covert action was designed to secure.

Examines the extent to which British policy, while successful in imposing a war of attrition upon Nasser in the Yemen . Clive Jones is Senior Lecturer in International Politics and Middle East Studies at the University of Leeds. Country of Publication. It breaks new ground by analyzing the extent to which Britain came to support the Royalist cause despite public declarations of n-involvement in the Yemen conflict, and details for the first time how London's tacit support for 'mercenary operations' in the Yemen came to enlist the help of Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Departments of History and Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, New York University, New York; e-mail . Full text views reflects the number of PDF downloads, PDFs sent to Google Drive, Dropbox and Kindle and HTML full text views

Departments of History and Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, New York University, New York; e-mail: pv17@nyu. Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 February 2008. Full text views reflects the number of PDF downloads, PDFs sent to Google Drive, Dropbox and Kindle and HTML full text views. Abstract views reflect the number of visits to the article landing page.

Examines the extent to which British policy, while successful in imposing a war of attrition upon Nasser in the Yemen, contributed to the political demise of the very objective covert action was designed to secure

Examines the extent to which British policy, while successful in imposing a war of attrition upon Nasser in the Yemen, contributed to the political demise of the very objective covert action was designed to secure. It breaks new ground by analyzing the extent to which Britain came to support the Royalist cause despite public declarations of non-involvement in the Yemen conflict, and details for the first time how London's tacit support for 'mercenary operations' in the Yemen came to enlist the help of Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Between 1962 and 1965 Britain engaged in covert operations in support of. .and Mandarins : Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action.

Covert action was regarded as a legitimate tool of foreign policy as Britain attempted to secure the future of the newly formed South Arabian Federation against the animus of Nasser. Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1965: Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins : Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action. Sussex Academic Press, 2004 - 273 sayfa.

Between 1962 and 1965 Britain engaged in covert operations in support of Royalist forces fighting the Egyptian backed Republican regime that had seized power in.

The use of covert action, as well as the quasi approval given to the use of mercenaries to support the Royalist cause, was the inevitable result of policy differences within Whitehall (most notably between the 'mandarins' of the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office) as well as international constraints imposed upon the UK in the aftermath of the Suez crisis.