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ePub The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan download

by Lester W. Grau

ePub The Bear Went Over the Mountain:  Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan download
Author:
Lester W. Grau
ISBN13:
978-0714648576
ISBN:
0714648574
Language:
Publisher:
Routledge; 1 edition (February 1, 2003)
Category:
Subcategory:
Humanities
ePub file:
1704 kb
Fb2 file:
1776 kb
Other formats:
lrf rtf lit txt
Rating:
4.7
Votes:
471

Главная Книги Grau Lester W. The Bear Went Over the Mountain. This invasion plan was also used in Afghanistan. Soviet military and KGB advisers permeated the structure of the Afghanistan Armed Forces

Главная Книги Grau Lester W. Soviet military and KGB advisers permeated the structure of the Afghanistan Armed Forces. In April 1979, General of the Army Aleksiy A. Yepishev, the head of the Main Political Directorate, led a delegation of several generals in a visit to Afghanistan to assess the situation. General Yepishev made a similar visit to Czechoslovakia prior to the 1968 invasion.

And this book is an analysis of what the Bear saw, experienced, and learned while on the other side of the . The Soviet invasion and war in Afghanistan provided a training ground for small unit tactics in a unique way that is well documented throughout this study.

And this book is an analysis of what the Bear saw, experienced, and learned while on the other side of the Mountain. Reading this should offer perspective to some of the similar issues facing us forces engaged there.

The Bear Went Over the Mountain Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan Les Grau. ark:/13960/t0xq4xn70.

This book is commonly recommended for military officers and students of counterinsurgency. This was how I ended up reading "The Bear Went Over the Mountain. Certainly the Soviet misadventures in Afghanistan are something we can learn from, but I'm afraid this book misses the mark by a wide margin. The Bear Went Over the Mountain" is delivered as a series of vignettes from Soviet officers, many of whom were company-grade officers at the time of the action.

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Read unlimited books and audiobooks on the web, iPad, iPhone and Android. Introduction by David M. Glantz, Former Director, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Grau, Lester W. The Bear Went Over the Mountain Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. National Defense University Press, 1996. Grau, Lester W. Russian Urban Tactics: Lessons from the Battle for Grozny

Grau, Lester W. Russian Urban Tactics: Lessons from the Battle for Grozny. National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995.

It is not a history of the Soviet-Afghan war, but snapshots of combat as seen by young platoon leaders, company commanders, battalion commanders and military advisers.

When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their . This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation.

When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival.

Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan.

This collection of vignettes was written by Soviet junior officers describing their experiences fighting the Mujahideen guerillas. It is not a history of the Soviet-Afghan war, but snapshots of combat as seen by young platoon leaders, company commanders, battalion commanders and military advisers.
  • Most reviews of actual combat are not literary bombshells. This one, however, exceeds the lower limits of that standard. Each story is very nearly a repeat of the previous. That is not the writer's fault, however. It is the fault of the old Soviet commanders who were less imaginative than a gopher in their planning for combat in Afghanistan. It is no wonder the Soviets were run out of that rag-tag country. Every operation was practically a blue print of the previous. There was almost no evolution of strategy or tactics on the Soviet side. The enemy, however, was constantly evolving and coming up with new horrors to bleed them. I commend the author for his commentary reviews of each action. He tries very hard to toss some light on otherwise dreadful military practice that was at best criminal and at worst, amateurish. The only shining examples of military behavior on the Soviet part is from junior grade officers who demonstrated amazing courage and surprising ingenuity in the face of almost impossible odds.

    It's a read...not a good one. but, it does shed light on an otherwise invisible side of military history. If there is anything to learn from it, I suppose it would be classified "How Not To Win A War"-

  • This book stands as an excellent example of Soviet tactical error in the broader scheme of warfare and operational successes in the microcosm of combat actions. The vignettes included in the work highlight a limited focus on anything close to a counterinsurgeny strategy, an over reliance on firepower to achieve decision on the battlefield, and additionally the Soviet Army's lack of a professional NCO corps.

    The information in this book is invaluable for assessing the evolution of Soviet military strategy in the asymmetrical environment of guerrilla warfare. One such developement is a liberal use of air power and artillery with little or no regard for the civilian population. The problem of air power was negated by the Afghan Mujahideen later in the conflict with the introduction of modern surface to air missile technology in the form of the American made Stinger missile. The Frunze Academy's and Editor's comments offer informed insights and criticisms to each engagement.

    This version of the book is the least expensive of the available printings of the book. Likely because it is filled with formatting errors. Notes are cut off in some sections but the most frustrating error was in the introduction. I had to flip back and forth in order to read it in sequence as the pages are arranged improperly.

  • The book show the short coming of soviet combat tactic used in A-stan .
    It allows for certain comparisons to US tactic to be applied and discourse the comparison to US tactic in Vietnam.
    One of the stand out revelations
    what the soviet govt and the US govt wanted to accomplish as an endgame, and how they are almost the same objective. How both countries have failed to accomplish this.

  • While normally very supportive of U.S. military missions, this read only reinforces my belief that ANY attempt to "pacify Afghanistan is doomed to fail. I don't believe any traditional military can succeed there. it is an insular nation filled with nationalistic zealots who while maybe hating their neighbor hate outsiders more. I understand the arguments about the terror haven/threat supposedly originating there, but I doubt any nation can eliminate it internally. This book should be required reading for any politician entertaining the folly of trying to pacify Afghanistan. The Soviets learned way too late, when will we?

  • Outstanding analysis of the 40th Field Army’s experiences as the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan. Thought provoking vignettes of combat actions showed the detailed and somewhat painstaking planning processes conducted by the Soviet Army, yet in many cases, did not yield the anticipated results. A bit turgid in spots, but otherwise an illuminating window into one of the most seminal, and tragic episodes of Russian history.

  • The Bear Went over the Mountain and The Other Side of the Mountain provide analysis of battles in Afghanistan from the viewpoint of Russian military and then of the Afghan resistance leaders. The overall results of the two books are two questions: why did Russia start a war they did not investigate enough resources to win and why did our country repeat this same stupidity.

  • Amazing reviews of Soviet tactics and strategies from the viewpoint of the soldiers on the ground. Book consists of concise after action reports written by soviet soldiers, and commentary from the Frunze academy and the military advisor-translators of the book. Especially relevant today, this'll learn you good about the nuances of modern warfare and unique challenges the soviets faced in Afghanistan.

  • A very nice review of the Soviet sojourn into Afghanistan. Well written, with very nice critiques at the end of each vignette.