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by Dmitri Glinski,Peter Reddaway

ePub The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy download
Author:
Dmitri Glinski,Peter Reddaway
ISBN13:
978-1929223077
ISBN:
1929223072
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Publisher:
United States Institute of Peace (February 2001)
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Subcategory:
Humanities
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1277 kb
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1925 kb
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The Tragedy of Russia s Reforms presents a boldly original analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of the Russian state

The Tragedy of Russia s Reforms presents a boldly original analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of the Russian state. The keys to understanding these events, the authors argue, are the prescriptions of Western transitologists, the International Monetary Fund, and advocates of economic shock therapy. These prescriptions allowed the nomenklatura and the The Tragedy of Russia s Reforms presents a boldly original analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of the Russian state.

By Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski. The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy. By Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski.

The fate of Russia's economic and political reforms is the subject of this interpretative history of the last years of the Soviet Union and the Yeltsin period, The book provides a useful, if controversial, introduction to the events.

The fate of Russia's economic and political reforms is the subject of this interpretative history of the last years of the Soviet Union and the Yeltsin period, The book provides a useful, if controversial, introduction to the events of this crucial period in Russian political development, from 1990 to 1999. The authors explain the observed cross-national variation in party system development as a function of the aspiring political elites'capabilities to solve social choice problems through party formation against the backdrop of past experiences with collective mobilization under and before communist rule.

The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism against Democracy, Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski (Washington, . Eurasia Group and World Policy Institute. Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2012. Recommend this journal.

Читать бесплатно книгу The tragedy of Russia's reforms. Полное библиографическое описание. Market bolshevism against democracy (Reddaway . Glinski . и другие произведения в разделе Каталог. Доступны электронные, печатные и аудиокниги, музыкальные произведения, фильмы. The tragedy of Russia's reforms. Market bolshevism against democracy. The tragedy of Russia's reforms : market bolshevism against democracy, Peter Reddaway, Dmitry Glinski. Washington : United States Institute of Peace press, 2001.

The Tragedy of Russia s Reforms presents a boldly original analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of the Russian state

The Tragedy of Russia s Reforms presents a boldly original analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of the Russian state.

There is plenty of blame to go around. And part of it sticks to the Cold War's victors in the United States, Europe and Japan, who could not summon the imagination and investment to seize the opportunity to repeat for a democratic Russia the miracle of Marshall Aid for post 1945 Western Europe

Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski

Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski. The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms Market Bolshevism Against Democracy. Against this backdrop, the authors see the central feature of the most recent period as a struggle between "market bolshevism" and democracy, with democracy losing.

Peter Reddaway, Dmitri Glinski (Vasiliev), "The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism against Democracy", US Institute of Peace Press, 2001, стр. 636-41. The final outcome was the abrupt dissolution of the USSR, accomplished in a conspiratorial style, without democratic deliberation in Russia and against the verdict of the March 1991 referendum on the preservation of the union.

First Online: 01 July 2001.

The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms presents a boldly original analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of the Russian state. The keys to understanding these events, the authors argue, are the prescriptions of Western “transitologists,” the International Monetary Fund, and advocates of economic “shock therapy.” These prescriptions allowed the nomenklatura and the financial “oligarchs” to acquire Russia’s industrial and natural resources and to heavily influence the country’s political destiny. In this long-awaited, sweeping interpretation, the authors skillfully place the contemporary Russian experience in the context of history, political theory, and Russia’s place in the international system.
  • A dense and intricate catalogue of the 1990s economic reforms. The authors show that the collapse of the Soviet Union was by no means inevitable, but was in fact the result of misunderstandings, poor choices and bad timing on the part of the actors involved. The USA does not come out of this story with much luster, unfortunately.

  • Peter Reddaway (George Washington University Washington, DC) und Dmitri Glinski (Institut für Weltwirtschaft und internationale Beziehungen Moskau) legen mit dieser voluminösen Studie der postsowjetischen russischen Reformversuche nicht nur die bisher bei weitem fundierteste Kritik des Reformkurses der Jelzin-Regierung vor. Sie steuern mit diesem Buch auch eine besonders detaillierte, fakten- und quellengesättigte Beschreibung der turbulenten Ereignisse im Rußland der 1990er sowie eine umfassende Interpretation dieses Jahrzehnts im Kontext der gesamten russischen Geschichte bei. Dieses Buch scheint dafür prädestiniert zu sein, sich zu einem Standardwerk zu Jelzins Herrschaft zu entwickeln.

    Aufgrund der Vielzahl der Ereignisse, Tendenzen, Theorien und Konzepte, die Reddaway und Glinski hier vorstellen, werden Rezensenten ganz verschiedene Aspekte erwähnenswert finden.

    Reddaways und Glinskis Konzipierung und Verwendung des Bolschewismusbegriffs ist in diesem Zusammenhang durchaus einer ernsthaften Beachtung wert. Besteht - trotz aller offensichtlichen ideologischen Gegensätze zwischen den Bolschewiki des beginnenden und radikalen Reformern des ausgehenden 20. Jahrhunderts - womöglich tatsächlich eine strukturelle Ähnlichkeit im Gesellschaftsbild, Selbstverständnis und der Transformationsstrategie beider Gruppierungen? Viele Beobachter - so auch dieser - würden eine derartige Gleichstellung zunächst ablehnen. Nach der Lektüre des Buches stellt sich jedoch die Sinnhaftigkeit eines Vergleichs beider Strömungen nicht mehr als so abwegig dar (wenn auch eine pauschale Gleichstellung weiterhin ungerechtfertigt erscheint). Zumindest ist festzustellen, daß die Ereignisse der 1990er als eine Revolution und die "Reformer" als Revolutionäre zu betrachten sind. Auch läßt sich eine gewisse Arroganz im öffentlichen Auftreten solcher Männer wie Anatolij Cubais, Boris Fëdorov oder Egor Gajdar sowie der dubiose, ja destruktive Charakter bestimmter "Reformschritte", insbesondere der Privatisierung einiger Filetstücke der russischen Industrie nach dem "Kredite für Aktien"-Schema, nicht bestreiten. Zudem können einige Figuren im Lager der "Reformer", wie etwa der berüchtigte, später als Stabschef der Union Rechter Kräfte fungierende Alfred Koch, wohl kaum als wirkliche Demokraten bezeichnet werden. Ebenso erscheinen die teilweise ambivalenten Stellungnahmen einiger als "Westler" geltender Politiker zum Tschetschenienabenteuer des konservativen Teils der Jelzinadministration als alarmierend. Nicht zuletzt machen Reddaway und Glinski zu Recht darauf aufmerksam, daß das Verhältnis zwischen freier Marktwirtschaft und Demokratie keineswegs so eineindeutig ist, wie es viele russische "Refomer" sowie einige westliche Kommentatoren den einfachen Russen glauben machen wollten. Ob dies und einige weitere Aspekte der Reformversuche der 1990er ausreichend sind, um von einem "Marktbolschewismus" der "Reformer" der verschiedenen Jelzinregierungen zu sprechen, wird der Leser für sich entscheiden müssen. Die Fülle von Reddaways und Glinskis Argumenten stimmt zumindest nachdenklich.

    Wie wohl viele Leser, ist auch dieser Rezensent mit einer ganzen Reihe von Reddaways und Glinskis Bewertungen und Aussagen bezüglich der Gründe für die Schmerzhaftigkeit beziehungsweise das teilweise Scheitern der Reformen nicht einverstanden. Trotzdem scheint mir das Buch ein wertvoller Beitrag zu sein, weicht es doch auf erfrischende, ja manchmal provokative Art und Weise vom sogenannten "Washington-Konsensus" ab. Obwohl sich Reddaway und Glinski mit ihren Angriffen auf viele westliche Beobachter und ihrer unverblümten Verurteilung einer ganzen Reihe im Westen bislang hoch angesehener russischer "Reformer" nur wenig Freunde machen werden, kann den Autoren schon jetzt dazu gratuliert werden, einen der bislang markantesten Beiträge zur Diskussion um die russischen Reformen gemacht zu haben.

  • - as one of the best post-Soviet post-mortems of "market bolshevism" and its hijacking of the New Russia. For one brief period the yearning of the masses to penetrate the iron curtain from within, and the wolves at the gate salivating without, were united in the figure of Boris Yeltsin in tearing down said wall. That more would be buried - or even crushed - under the rubble than bounding over into the New World Order was predictable; but those who raised doubts were swept aside as "red-brown" reactionaries out to throw mud at the golden dawn blazing upon the horizon.

    Of course, Gorby laid the groundwork for his own collapse with core strategic mis-steps: holding elections in the republics first, prior to the Union level; giving Yeltsin a power-base by allowing the creation of a Russian presidency; renegotiating the terms of union when having already surrendered his local support; his failure to cultivate the new, rising labor movement across the former USSR; weakening his own party by creating a separate branch for the Russian Federation; his belief that "market reform" and democracy were two sides of the same hard-currency coin, when in fact he was being sold a counterfeit bill of goods by Westerners already deep into global fraud. Unable to bridge his self-created breach, his glasnost collapsed in a week-long struggle between what was left of the USSR's "power ministries" and Yeltsin's "New Russians", a process Reddaway and Glinski describe meticulously before dissecting its results.

    Yeltsin's "oligarchical conservatism disguised as reform" (p. 352) dovetailed nicely with "really existing Western democracy," to borrow the old Soviet phrase. Economists, academics, and politicians who saw no contradiction in Pinochet's Chile as a role model of freedom also had no trouble with Yeltsin's giving the peoples' store away to Russia's One Percent. Western pundits cheered as "Tzar Boris" sent tanks to blow holes in the Russian parliament building, while continuing to demonize Lenin's 1918 non-violent closure of the Constituent Assembly. This Western schizophrenia may help explain why it is often not taken seriously as a role model for "developing democracies," rather than the backward-looking corruption of its opponents. Of course, market reform has only increased corruption, precisely by expanding the market for it.

    Also richly explored was Yeltsin's trading away the Union to consolidate his own power in Moscow, over the heads of those for whom he allegedly governed. Moscow has ever since tried to regain its near abroad, by one means or another. This fear was one of the core reasons for the coup against Gorby in '91 and played a dominant role in the "conservative opposition." But through its own confused factionalism and comic-opera stance, in finally choosing Yeltsin against the coupmakers that same vital year - or staying neutral - the military/intelligence apparat largely disarmed itself as a credible counterforce; becoming the instrument for Yeltsin's own coup in '93. The detailing of Yeltsin's selling his re-election to the highest investors should be a stark warning of our own future post-Citizens United.

    A vital read for understanding this era of Russia, a pivotal and paradoxical time of missed opportunity and rampant opportunism, whose legacy will forseeably haunt its citizens and the world.