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ePub Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) download

by Christopher S. Hill

ePub Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) download
Author:
Christopher S. Hill
ISBN13:
978-0521394239
ISBN:
0521394236
Language:
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (January 25, 1991)
Category:
Subcategory:
Humanities
ePub file:
1555 kb
Fb2 file:
1515 kb
Other formats:
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Rating:
4.9
Votes:
314

The topic of this book belongs to what is usually thought of as the philosophy of mind, but it is very much the work of a metaphysician and logician.

The topic of this book belongs to what is usually thought of as the philosophy of mind, but it is very much the work of a metaphysician and logician. It is a pleasure to read a book in which an author who talks about 'functional roles' takes the trouble to say what ontological category these objects belong to and what individuates them.

Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Start by marking Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read.

This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read.

According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds, and unity of consciousness.

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY In defense of pure reason This book is concerned with the .

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY In defense of pure reason This book is concerned with the alleged capacity of the human. Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy). Emotion (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy). Subjects of Experience (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy).

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Christopher S. Hill Boyd, . 1980, ‘Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail.

Block, . 1978, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, in C. W. Savage (e.,Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9, 261–325. Boyd, . 1980, ‘Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail,’ in N. Block, (e.,Readings in Philosophy of Psychology I, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Cambridge Core - Logic - Sensations - by Christopher S. Hill. A Defense of Type Materialism. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and cognitive scientists.

This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds, and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and cognitive scientists.