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ePub Binding Words: Conscience and Rhetoric in Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger (Topics In Historical Philosophy) download

by Karen S. Feldman

ePub Binding Words: Conscience and Rhetoric in Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger (Topics In Historical Philosophy) download
Author:
Karen S. Feldman
ISBN13:
978-0810122802
ISBN:
0810122804
Language:
Publisher:
Northwestern University Press; 1 edition (July 21, 2006)
Subcategory:
Philosophy
ePub file:
1877 kb
Fb2 file:
1832 kb
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Rating:
4.7
Votes:
713

In Hobbes, the word "conscience," when applied to individual certainty, is seen as a. .I recommend this book to students and scholars of contemporary Continental Philosophy in general, and of Hegel and Heidegger in particular. 11 people found this helpful.

Feldman looks at Hobbes's critique of this metaphorical use, but also at the ways in which Hobbes himself exploits the power of metaphor in his own writing.

Conscience, as Binding Words convincingly argues .

Turning to Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger, Feldman analyzes the sophisticated rhetorical moves by which these thinkers negotiate the register and space in which such a ''concept'' can take hold. The concept of binding force is at stake in this book on two different levels: there is an investigation of how, within the work of Hobbes, Hegel and Heidegger, conscience is described as binding upon us: and further.

Start by marking Binding Words: Conscience and Rhetoric in Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read.

Feldman presents Heidegger's Being and Time as a text that reveals the question concerning the meaning of being . Citation: Trevor Tchir.

Feldman presents Heidegger's Being and Time as a text that reveals the question concerning the meaning of being as a rhetorical one, insofar as it cannot in proper words ask what it should.

She demonstrates that conscience can only be described and understood through tropes and figures of langugae. If description in literal terms is impossible, asBinding Wordsconvincingly argues, perhaps there is no such thing. But if the word "conscience" has no tangible referent, then how can conscience be constructed asbinding?

The concept of binding force is at stake in this book on two different levels: there is an investigation of how, within the work of Hobbes, Hegel and Heidegger . Metaphysics and Epistemology.

The concept of binding force is at stake in this book on two different levels: there is an investigation of how, within the work of Hobbes, Hegel and Heidegger, conscience i.

Karen S. Feldman, Binding Words . Finally, in Chapter 3, Feldman turns to Heidegger's discussion of conscience in Being and Time. Hegel's text on conscience is quite complex, and there is a substantial literature focused on its interpretation. Feldman, Binding Words: Conscience and Rhetoric in Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger, Northwestern University Press, 2006, 158pp. Being as such is never reducible to any being; indeed, any being, by virtue of its limited nature, must necessarily be inadequate as a representation of being itself.

The question this raises, and the one that interests Feldman here is: If conscience.

Feldman investigates how, within these works, conscience is described as binding upon us while at the same time asking how texts themselves may be read as binding.

The very topic of inner speech conjures an aura of loneliness, whether hapless or wilful. It covers an emotional spectrum shading from the selfconsciousness which eavesdrops on itself to the manias of aural possession. There’s a thick history to this, intersecting with historical fluctuations in the idea of solitude and its worth. At periods the solitary became decorative; so hermits were hired to grace, hairily, the grottoes of eighteenth-century estates.

In a provactive work that brings new tools to the history of philosophy, Karen S. Feldman offers an elegant account of how philosophical language appears to produce the very thing it claims to describe. She demonstrates that conscience can only be described and understood through tropes and figures of langugae. If description in literal terms is impossible, as Binding Words convincingly argues, perhaps there is no such thing. But if the word "conscience" has no tangible referent, then how can conscience be constructed as binding? Does our conscience move us to do things, or is this yet another figure of speech?Hobbes's Leviathan, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and Heidegger's Being and Time dramatize conscience's relation to language and knowledge, morality and duty, and ontology. Feldman investigates how, within these works, conscience is described as binding upon us while at the same time asking how texts themselves may be read as binding.