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by W. G. Runciman

ePub A Critique of Max Weber's Philosophy of Social Science download
Author:
W. G. Runciman
ISBN13:
978-0521892759
ISBN:
0521892759
Language:
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (April 18, 2002)
Subcategory:
Politics & Government
ePub file:
1986 kb
Fb2 file:
1960 kb
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Rating:
4.4
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322

Runciman argues that Weber's analysis breaks down at three decisive points: the difference between theoretical pre-suppositions and implicit value-judgements; the . has been added to your Cart.

Runciman argues that Weber's analysis breaks down at three decisive points: the difference between theoretical pre-suppositions and implicit value-judgements; the manner in which 'idiographic' explanations are to be subsumed under causal laws; and the relation of explanation to description in sociology. The arguments which Weber put forward are fundamental to the methodology of the social sciences.

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Runciman argues that Weber's analysis breaks down at three decisive points: the difference between theoretical pre-suppositions and implicit value-judgements; the manner in which 'idiographic' explanations a This essay is written in the belief that it is possible to say both where Ma. .

Runciman argues that Weber's analysis breaks down at three decisive points: the difference between theoretical pre-suppositions and implicit value-judgements; the manner in which 'idiographic' explanations a This essay is written in the belief that it is possible to say both where Max Weber's philosophy of social science is mistaken and how these mistakes can be put right.

This essay is written in the belief that it is possible to say both where Max Weber's philosophy of social science is mistaken and how these mistakes can be put right. Runciman argues that Weber's analysis breaks down at three decisive points: the difference between theoretical pre-suppositions and implicit value-judgements; the manner in which 'idiographic' explanations are to be subsumed under causal laws; and the relation of explanation to description in sociology.

where Max Weber’s philosophy of social science is mistaken and how these mistakes can be put right.

Поставляется из: Англии Описание: This essay is written in the belief that it is possible to say both where Max Weber’s philosophy of social science is mistaken and how these mistakes can be put right. The arguments which Weber put forward are fundamental to the methodology of the social sciences, and since his death it has come to be increasingly widely held that with perhaps the sole exception of Mill’s System of Logic there is still no other body of work of comparable importance in the academic literature on these topics.

Philosophy of Science. Volume 40, Number 2 Ju. 1973. A Critique of Max Weber's Philosophy of Social Science.

Find many great new & used options and get the best deals for A Critique of Max Weber's Philosophy of.Ships from the UK. Former Library books. Shows some signs of wear, and may have some markings on the inside. 100% Money Back Guarantee.

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New Philosophies of Social Science. Traducción de: A critique of Max Weber's philosophy of social science. A Symposium on Mario Bunge’s Philosophy of Social Science, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34, nos. 2 and . The author discusses therefore only those solutions in Bunge’s book that seem most problematic, namely, Bunge’s proposal to expel charlatans from universities; his treatment of social laws; his notions of mechanisms, mechanismic explanation, and systemism; and his reading of Popper’s social philosophy.

Weber's treatment of the relationship between social science and the ends of action and therewith of policy should aid social scientists . Useful analyses of some of Max Weber's methodolog-. ical problems will be found in F. A. Hayek. Scientism and the Study of Society": Economica: .

Weber's treatment of the relationship between social science and the ends of action and therewith of policy should aid social scientists to see both their possibilities and their limitations. It should dissolve the false identification of an apolitical attitude with scientific integrity, and it should help to refute the baseless accusation that the social sciences arc ethically relativistic or. nihilistic either in their logical implications or in their empirical con-.

This essay is written in the belief that it is possible to say both where Max Weber's philosophy of social science is mistaken and how these mistakes can be put right. Runciman argues that Weber's analysis breaks down at three decisive points: the difference between theoretical pre-suppositions and implicit value-judgements; the manner in which 'idiographic' explanations are to be subsumed under causal laws; and the relation of explanation to description in sociology. The arguments which Weber put forward are fundamental to the methodology of the social sciences, and since his death it has come to be increasingly widely held that with perhaps the sole exception of Mill's System of Logic there is still no other body of work of comparable importance in the academic literature on these topics. Runciman's attempt to correct Weber's mistakes therefore constitutes in itself a valuable contribution to the philosophy of social science.